

## Message Text

PAGE 01    USBERL 02673 140113Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01  
IO-13 ACDA-07 EB-07 /086 W  
----- 117653 /67

R 111115Z DEC 76  
FM USMISSION USBERLIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3585  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L USBERLIN 2673

(C O R R E C T E D C O P Y PARA 5 FIRST TWO SENTENCES OMMITTED  
IN ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION)

E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US, UK, FR , WB  
SUBJECT: COURTESY CALL OF AMBASSADOR STOESSEL ON SOVIET AMBASSADOR  
ABRASIMOV

REFS:A) USBERLIN 924 OF 14 MAY 1975 C) USBERLIN 2424  
B)USBERLIN 1892 OF 16 SEPT 1975 D)USBERLIN 2563

1. SUMMARY:  
DURING INITIAL PROTOCOL VISIT BY AMBASSADOR  
STOESSEL ON AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV, LATTER MADE FAMILIAR  
PLEA FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE QA. ABRASIMOV  
MENTIONED TWO SPECIFIC TOPICS: NEAR-MISSES INVOLVING  
PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT AND EAST GERMAN REFUGEE WHO WALKED  
THROUGH CHECKPOINT CHARLIE ON OCTOBER 23 IN US UNIFORM.  
ABRASIMOV WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL IN STATING HIS DESIRE  
TO WORK CLOSELY IN FUTURE WITH AMBASSADOR STOESSEL.  
END SUMMARY.

2. ON DECEMBER 10, AMBASSADOR STOESSEL PAID INITIAL  
COURTESY CALL ON AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV WHO RECEIVED  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02    USBERL 02673 140113Z

HIM WARMLY. AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV RECALLED HIS MEET-  
INGS WITH AMBASSADOR STOESSEL IN MOSCOW AS WELL AS  
THIRTY-TWO PRIVATE MEETINGS HE HAD HAD WITH WESTERN  
AMBASSADORS IN NEGOTIATING THE QA. ABRASIMOV

RECOUNTED HOW US AND SOVIET SIDE HAD PERSUADED FIRST THE FRENCH AND THEN THE BRITISH TO AGREE TO QA PROVISIONS AND HOW A GOOD RESULT, THE " MAXIMAL VARIANT", WAS ACHIEVED BECAUSE OF BEST EFFORTS OF WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. THE AGREEMENT WAS GOOD ONE BASED ON OUR MUTUAL DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL AND DEVELOPING WEST BERLIN IN WHICH THE PEOPLE COULD LIVE WELL AND WITHOUT CONFRONTATION. IT WAS UP TO THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION NOW TO CONTROL THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT.

3. AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV RAISED TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES AS EXAMPLED OF THE NEED FOR CONTROL. THE FIRST CONCERNED THE HISTORY OF NEAR-MISSES WITH PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN 1975 ( REFS A AND B) WHICH ABRASIMOV HAD CAREFULLY RESEARCHED THROUGH THE SOVIET AIR FORCE COMMAND WHICH HAD SHOWN HIM DOCUMENTS SHOWING WHERE EACH OF THEIR PLANES WERE AT WHAT MOMENT. HOWEVER, IT TURNED OUT, THE PAN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED TO THE SOVIETS. ABRASIMOV STRESSED THAT HE WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO ENSURE AIR SAFETY SO THAT INNOCENT PEOPLE WOULDT NOT SUFFER.

4. ABRASIMOV THEN RAISED THE RECENT INCIDENT WHERE A MAN HAD LEFT EAST BERLIN THROUGH CHECKPOINT CHARLIE IN A US UNIFORM (REFS C AND D). THE UNIFORM HAD NOT BELONGED TO HIM. THE EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL AT THE CONTROL POINT HAD DETAINED HIM BUT HAD LET HIM GO WHEN HE SAID HE WAS A US SOLIDER. HOWEVER, THE MAN HAD NOT BEEN STOPPED BY THE US AUTHORITIES. ABRASIMOV NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT GIVE THE GDR THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE DOCUMENTS OF ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN UNIFORM. THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED THE US REPRESENTATIVE IN WEST BERLIN TO LOOK CAREFULLY INTO THEIR CONTROL PROCEDURES. THE ANSWER HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE US POLAD DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. THIS WAS A CASE FOR THE JDGES.

5. ABRASIMOV THEN URGED THE ALLIES TO FIND PEOPLE WHO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03      USBERL 02673 140113Z

WILL INSIST ON STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE QA. HE CLAIMED THERE WERE PEOPLE IN BONN WHO WANT PURPOSELY TO START FIGHTS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. ABRASIMOV KNEW THAT THE US HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN WEST BERLIN AS DID THE SOVIET UNION; HERE HE DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN THE SOVIET ARMY HAD LIBERATED THE REICHSTAG FLOOR-BY-FLOOR AND HOW THE SOVIET ARMY HAD SUFFERED 300,000 KILLED OR WOUNDED THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN. IN 1961 HE HAD RETURNED TO BERLIN AS AMBASSADOR AND HE AND HIS WIFE HAD THEN THOUGHT SOMETHING BIG WAS GOING ON IF THERE WERE FIVE PEOPLE AROUND UNTER DEN LINDEN IN THE EVENING.

6. IN SUMMARY, ABRASIMOV SAID HE WANTED TO FIND A GOOD COMMON LANGUAGE WITH AMBASSADOR STOESSEL. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD CREATED A GOOD DOCUMENT AND NOW THEY SHOULD PRESERVE IT. THE "5TH OR 6TH" POWER WANTS TO INTERPRET IT, TO PICK AND CHOOSE PARTS OF IT AND IGNORE OTHERS. WHAT IS NEEDED IS COOPERATION IN PRESERVING THE SPIRIT AND CONTENT OF THE QA.

7. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL REPLIED THAT THE US REGARDED THE QA AS A GOOD AGREEMENT WHICH IS IMPORTNAT TO THE UNITED STATES. IT REFLECTS PROPERLY THE INTERESTS OF EACH SIDE. IT NEEDS TO BE FULLY OBSERVED AND APPLIED IN ALL ITS PARTS.

8. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL AGREED THAT IT IS ONLY FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO INTERPRET THE AGREEMENT. OTHERS CAN SAY WHAT THEY THINK OF COURSE. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL WAS CONVINCED HE COULD WORK WITH AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV WHO IS AN EXPERT ON THEQA. HE THOUGHT THERE MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN TOO MANY PROTESTS, NOT ALL OF WHICH WERE IMPORTANT BUT WHICH TOGETHER CAST A SHADOW ON THE AGREEMENT.

9. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ALL OF THE DETAILS ABOUT THE MAN WHO LEFT EAST BERLIN IN A US UNIFORM BUT HE WAS AGAINST SUCH AN ABUSE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04      USBERL 02673 140113Z

OF THE FREE RIGHT OF MEMBERS OF HE US FORCES TO ENTER EAST BERLIN. IN THE CASE OF SUCH ABUSES, THE US TAKES THE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

10. IN REMAINDER OF CONVERSATION AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV ASKED ABOUT SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATE VANCE AND ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CSU'S DECISION NOT TO REMAIN IN A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY GROUP WITH THE CDU IN BONN. AMBASSADOR STOESSEL NOTED SECRETARY-DESIGNATE VANCE'S LONG EXPERIENCE WITH DIPLOMATIC ISSUES INCLUDING DISARMAMENT AND OTHER SUBJECTS DIRECTLY INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE NO ONE COULD KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE DISPUTE WITHIN THE CDU/CSU, IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FORMATION OF THE FRG COALITION GOVERNMENT IN MID-DECEMBER. HOWEVER, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN FRG POLITICS ALTHOUGH NOBODY KNEW EXACTLY HOW IT WOULD WORK OUT IN THE END.

11. COMMENT.  
ABRASIMOV WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SECRETARY TYUTYUNOV; AMBASSADOR STOESSEL BY DEPUTY

POLAD SEMLER. ABRASIMOV WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL END-  
ING THE VISIT BY CONDUCTING AMBASSADOR STOESSEL ON  
A TOUR OF HIS VAST EMBASSY. WE JUDGE THAT  
ABRASIMOV'S REMARKS ABOUT THE RITTER CASE WERE MADE  
IN A RELAXED, MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER, VEIN AND  
WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT HE WILL NOT PRESS FOR  
A MORE FORTHCOMING REPLY OR TAKE ANY ACTION ABOUT IT.  
ABRASIMOV ENDED THE MEETING BY EXTENDING A LUNCHEON  
INVITATION " TO DISCUSS ANYTHING OF INTEREST TO US "  
WITHOUT SETTING A DATE FOR IT.  
GEORGE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 16 SEP 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, AMBASSADORS, MEETING REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 DEC 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976USBERL02673  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D760458-0605  
**From:** USBERLIN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19761293/baaaerjo.tel  
**Line Count:** 176  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 07 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <07 APR 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <02 AUG 2004 by BoyleJA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** COURTESY CALL OF AMBASSADOR STOESSEL ON SOVIET AMBASSADOR  
**TAGS:** PFOR, UR, US, UK, FR, WB, (STOESSEL, WALTER J JR), (ABRASIMOV)  
**To:** STATE  
BONN INFO BERLIN  
LONDON  
MOSCOW  
PARIS  
USNATO

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006